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M
ost economic theory presumes—often implicitly—a system of law and
adjudication. After all, institutions like property, contract, and govern-
ment regulation typically entail mechanisms for law-creation and law-
application, which usually (though perhaps not inevitably) imply some kind of
judicial system (Posner, 2008, pp. 5–6). Because judges are often responsible for
interpreting and enforcing the “rules of the game,” they are signiﬁcant economic
policymakers.
Consider ﬁve out of many possible illustrations: First, the scope of contract
rights is determined, in large measure, by judicial decisions, and judges sometimes
refuse to enforce the terms of a contract as written because they view the contract
as substantively unconscionable or because they discern ﬂaws in the bargaining
process. For example, in recent years many judges have demonstrated hostility to
arbitration clauses in employment contracts, which in turn affects the labor market
(Burton, 2006). Second, the allocation of the social costs of various economic
activities has economic consequences both for distribution and, if transaction costs
are nontrivial, for efﬁciency (Coase, 1960; Calabresi and Malamed, 1972). Courts
are often responsible for making these allocations. For example, judicial decisions
may determine whether landowners are liable for injuries that result from activities
that take place on their property, and, if so, whether such liability shall be strict
(that is, without regard to fault) or based only on negligence (Shugerman, 2000).
These judicial decisions, in turn, may have signiﬁcant consequences for owners’
land-use decisions, as well as the location and activity choices of potential victims
(Shavell, 1980). Third, even when the risks associated with particular economic
activities are addressed principally through regulation rather than litigation, judges
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fundamental regulatory policy questions is whether the responsible agency is
permitted or required to subject proposed regulations to a cost–beneﬁt analysis.
Yet many statutes do not address this issue clearly, meaning that it is up to judges
to decide when cost–beneﬁt analysis is required, prohibited, or optional (Sunstein,
2001). More generally, the authority of courts to review agency regulations for
“reasonableness” gives judges considerable ability to inﬂuence the substantive
content of regulatory policy (Miles and Sunstein, 2006; Stephenson, 2006a).
Fourth, virtually the entire content of antitrust law in the United States, including
the law on horizontal agreements, monopolization, and merger regulation, has
been supplied by the courts. Although the legal basis for this body of antitrust law
is nominally statutory, the relevant statutory provisions have been construed as
broad grants of authority to the federal courts to fashion antitrust law (Baxter,
1982; Easterbrook, 1984, 2004). Fifth, in contrast with antitrust law, tax law is
characterized by a dense thicket of detailed statutory law and regulations. Yet
judges play a critical role in determining tax liability, principally due to judicially
created anti-tax-avoidance principles, such as the “business purpose” doctrine and
the “economic substance” doctrine, which allow courts to impose substantial tax
liabilities after the fact on entities that would avoid such liabilities according to the
formal law. These judge-made doctrines have substantial economic consequences
(Weisbach, 2002).
In the light of the substantial economic impact of judicial decisions on these
and other issues, judicial decision making is an important subject of economic
analysis. Analyzing judicial behavior poses particular challenges, though, both
because judges (like many other government agents) are not motivated principally
by material incentives and because judges are often supposed to interpret and
enforce something called “law”—the product of supposedly authoritative decisions
made by other public and private actors that includes statutes, regulations, con-
tracts, and prior judicial decisions. How much (if at all) does this fact distinguish
judges from other government policymakers? Do judges act as neutral third-party
enforcers of substantive decisions made by others? Are judges “ordinary” policy-
makers who advance whatever outcomes they favor without any special consider-
ation for law as such? More generally, how should we think about the relationship
between judges’ individual policy preferences and their role as interpreters and
appliers of law?
While there has been a great deal of quantitative empirical work in economics
and cognate disciplines (especially political science) on judicial decision making,
much of the early work pitted a highly mechanical vision of judges as neutral
“umpires” against a vision of judges as purely outcome-oriented political actors
unconstrained by law. Emerging recent scholarship, however, has started to explore
more nuanced conceptions of how law, facts, and judicial preferences may interact
to inﬂuence judicial decisions. This work develops a perspective on judging that
can usefully be understood as the modern manifestation of American Legal Real-
ism, a jurisprudential movement of lawyers, judges, and law professors that ﬂour-
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simpliﬁed form, the Realist account of judicial decision making; to contrast this
view with alternative theories about law and judging; and to sketch out how a more
explicit integration of the Realists’ conceptual insights about law and judicial
behavior might enrich the rapidly expanding economic work in this ﬁeld.
Theories of Adjudication: Formalism, Skepticism, Realism
To frame the discussion of different theories of judicial behavior, consider a
hypothetical case. Suppose that the legislature has enacted a labor standards statute
that guarantees workers overtime pay under certain conditions, and the statute also
contains an “anti-retaliation” provision that prohibits ﬁrms from ﬁring employees if
they ﬁle a complaint with the government alleging noncompliance with this statute.
Next, imagine that a ﬁrm that hires an employee under a contract, drafted by the
ﬁrm’s attorneys, that appears to give the ﬁrm the right to ﬁre the employee at will.
Sometime after the employee is hired, she complains to her boss that she is due
overtime pay under the labor statute. The ﬁrm ﬁres the employee, and the
employee sues. The judge hearing the case will have to decide whether the ﬁrm can
ﬁre the employee under these circumstances. In reaching a decision, the judge
would have to decide whether the at-will termination provision of the employment
contract is legally valid, whether the statutory anti-retaliation provision applies in
these circumstances, whether retaliation was the employer’s actual motivation in
this case, and so forth.
1
What factors will inﬂuence how the judge resolves this hypothetical dispute?
Before getting to the Realist perspective, let us consider ﬁrst two common alterna-
tive views of judicial decision making that I will call “mechanical legal formalism”
and “radical legal skepticism.” These views may seem like caricatures, yet many
discussions and analyses of judicial decision making implicitly or explicitly presume
one of these two accounts.
Mechanical legal formalism holds that the “law” consists of a collection of
rules contained in a well-deﬁned set of source materials—principally statutes,
regulations, contracts, and prior judicial decisions—along with a relatively small
number of fundamental legal concepts. At least according to the pure version
of Formalism, every legal question has a right answer that a properly trained
lawyer or judge can deduce by correctly applying the canonical legal materials
to the facts of the case. This view implies that a disagreement over the correct
1 This example is based loosely on the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and on particular
judicial decisions regarding the interpretation of the Act’s anti-retaliation provisions. The federal courts
of appeals have decided a number of such cases, yet different courts have reached quite different results.
Compare, for example, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s decision in Lambert v. Genesee
Hospital (10 F.3d 46 [1993]) ﬁnding that the FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision did not apply when the
employee complains to the ﬁrm, rather than to the federal agency, with the Ninth Circuit’s decision in
Lambert v. Ackerley (180 F.3d 997 (en banc) [1999]), reaching the opposite conclusion.
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an error of legal reasoning, acted in bad faith, or been misinformed as to the
relevant facts or law. On most versions of the Formalist account, moreover,
judges strive to apply the law correctly. Therefore, although human fallibility
makes errors inevitable, the outcome of most cases can be predicted by trained
lawyers, who can deduce the correct legal outcome by consulting the canonical
sources. More moderate Formalists acknowledge the possibility that the law may
sometimes contain gaps or ambiguities, but believe these gaps to be relatively
uncommon and typically ﬁlled quickly. For convenience, in this essay I will refer
to mechanical legal formalism simply as “Formalism,” although there are other
varieties of Formalist legal thought that are more nuanced (for example,
Schauer, 1988a; Tamanaha, 2008a).
How, according to the Formalist perspective, would a judge resolve the hypo-
thetical employment dispute sketched above? First, the judge would look at what
the relevant statutes, case law, and maxims of interpretation say about the criteria
for contractual validity. If the contract is valid, the judge would then consider
whether the labor statute limited an employer’s freedom to terminate an employee
for complaining to the employer (as opposed to the government) about the ﬁrm’s
alleged failure to comply with the statute. The judge would do this by consulting the
text of the statute and applying established “canons” of statutory construction—
interpretive rules for parsing statutory texts, often with fancy-sounding Latin names
like expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the expression of one thing implies the
exclusion of others). According to the Formalist account, all judges who properly
apply the principles of legal reasoning should—and likely would—reach the same,
correct answers to these questions.
In contrast, radical legal skepticism—which for convenience I will refer to as
“Skepticism”—accepts the deﬁnitional claim that the “law” consists of a set of
canonical legal source materials, but denies that these sources supply a determinate
answer to any signiﬁcant legal question. Rather, Skeptics claim law is so malleable
that plausible legal arguments, derived from canonical legal sources, are almost
always available to justify any conceivable resolution of a contested case—and that
if a plausible legal argument were not available, a judge could always change or
ignore the law. Furthermore, Skeptics argue that judges have considerable leeway
to characterize the facts of the case in such a way that they can get to a preferred
outcome regardless of the law (Frank, 1949; Gennaioli and Shleifer, 2008). In this
view, law is so indeterminate that it does not impose any meaningful constraint on
judicial decision making. According to Skeptics, legal “reasoning” of the sort that
appears in judicial opinions is merely an after-the-fact rationalization that obscures
or mystiﬁes the true basis for judicial decisions. What is this true basis? Generally,
say the Skeptics, judicial decisions depend on the preferences of the judges over
substantive outcomes—who wins and who loses. While these preferences may
reﬂect idiosyncratic biases or concerns about career and reputation, Skeptics
usually argue that the best predictor of case outcomes is the judge’s
194 Journal of Economic Perspectivespolitical ideology. Of course, not all cases implicate highly charged political con-
troversies like abortion or capital punishment, but most Skeptics suggest that
judges have ideological preferences even with respect to more mundane contro-
versies: judges tend to favor plaintiffs or defendants, individuals or corporations,
government or private citizens, and so on. Even in non-ideological cases, judges will
favor whichever party appears more sympathetic in the particular dispute.
How, according to the Skeptics, would a judge resolve the hypothetical em-
ployment example? The Skeptic would argue that the decision depends on whether
the judge wants to ﬁnd in favor of the employer or the employee, which in turn will
have a lot to do with whether the judge is generally a left-wing, pro-labor judge or
a right-wing, pro-management judge. (It may also depend on the judge’s view of the
particular parties involved in the case—perhaps the ﬁrm appears generally abusive
toward its employees or perhaps the employee seems lazy and litigious.) Whichever
way the judge wants to come out, the judge can rationalize the decision using
canonical legal sources and respectable legal arguments. For example, a judge who
favors the employer can point out that the employee consented to the at-will
contract without any threat or duress and that the plain text of the labor statute’s
anti-retaliation provision only applies if the employee complains to the government
agency. In support of the latter conclusion, the judge could invoke the expressio
unius canon of construction: the speciﬁc inclusion of an anti-retaliation provision
that applies when employees complain to the government implicitly excludes anti-
retaliation protections when employees complain to someone else (like a supervisor).
On the other hand, a judge who favors the employee can just as easily ﬁnd legal
justiﬁcations for a contrary holding. Such a judge could reason that the contract is
not truly the product of free bargaining because it is a standard-form contract
prepared by the employer (Burton, 2006). Furthermore, the labor statute’s guar-
antee of overtime pay, and the inclusion of an anti-retaliation provision, can be
read as implying a guarantee that an employee’s complaint to a supervisor about
failure to pay overtime may not be the basis for termination. In support of this
conclusion, the judge could point to another hoary maxim of interpretation that
instructs judges to construe remedial statutes broadly. According to the Skeptics,
neither decision is more legally “correct” because the law does not supply a
determinate answer.
It is sometimes implicitly assumed that Formalism and Skepticism are exclusive
and exhaustive accounts of judicial behavior. Thus, when the evidence shows
judicial behavior inconsistent with Formalism, the instinct is to revert to the
Skeptical view (Hart, 1961). This tendency to reduce the universe of positive
theories of adjudication to Formalism vs. Skepticism is also evident in the quanti-
tative empirical literature on judicial decision making, which at least until recently
tended to frame studies as comparisons between the “legal model” (that is, For-
malism) and the “attitudinal model” (that is, Skepticism)—with Skepticism usually
though not always coming out on top (for example, Segal and Spaeth, 1993, 2002;
Ruger, Kim, Martin, and Quinn, 2004; Sunstein, Schkade, Ellman, and Sawicki,
Legal Realism for Economists 1952006; Chang and Schoar, 2008).
2 For example, many empirical studies equate
Formalism with the null hypothesis that judge-speciﬁc variables are irrelevant to
judicial decisions and treat evidence that such factors matter as evidence in favor of
the Skeptical view.
3
Not all studies adopted such an extreme either–or approach, of course. One
common argument is that Formalism and Skepticism describe different domains of
judicial decision making. Perhaps Formalism characterizes some areas of law, like
run-of-the-mill contract law, while Skepticism is a better account in others like
constitutional law, at least in the set of cases that reach the Supreme Court (Posner,
2005). Or perhaps Formalism applies up until the point where the law “runs out,”
at which point Skepticism takes over (Schauer, 1988b; Feldman, 2005). Even on
these accounts, though, Formalism and Skepticism are implicitly the only options,
and the only question is which domains are better characterized by each. Yet by
treating Formalism and Skepticism as exhausting the set of alternatives, we may
overlook other possible relationships between legal source materials and judicial
decisions.
The ideas about law and judicial behavior contained in the writings of the
American Legal Realists—a jurisprudential movement of lawyers, judges, and law
professors that emerged in the early twentieth century and ﬂourished in the 1920s
and 1930s—may be useful for economists who want to move beyond the dichotomy
between the Formalist and Skeptical caricatures.
4 The Realists were a large and
diverse group, and any attempt to summarize their views runs the risk of oversim-
pliﬁcation. Yet if one theme clearly united the Realists, it was their opposition to the
Formalism that they saw as dominating legal thought in the late nineteenth century
2 The political science literature on judicial behavior also sometimes discusses the so-called “strategic
model,” but this is essentially also a version of Skepticism: the only difference between the “attitudinal
model” and the “strategic model” being whether judges are constrained by other actors (for example,
by the threat of legislative override) (Segal and Spaeth, 1993, 2002).
3 This description is obviously a simpliﬁcation. For a comprehensive recent survey of how the empirical
literature has tried to test the effects of judicial ideology on case outcomes, see Fischman and Law
(forthcoming).
4 Prominent Legal Realists included Karl Llewellyn, Jerome Frank, Max Radin, Robert Hale, Underhill
Moore, Herman Oliphant, Walter Wheeler Cook, and Felix Cohen, among many others. The Realist
“school” declined after World War II, and few modern scholars or judges consciously self-identify as
Realists. Nonetheless, the perspective associated with Realism has had a lasting impact on American legal
thought. Comprehensive treatments of American Legal Realism include Leiter (2003), Kalman (1986),
Schlegel (1995), and Twining (1973). A provocative revisionist analysis of the Realists and their
contributions is Tamanaha (2008b). For a useful collection of major Realist writings, with modern
commentary, see Fisher, Horowitz, and Reed (1993).
While this essay focuses on the Realists’ positive theories of judicial behavior, the Realists also had a
normative agenda that emphasized the need to consider the actual consequences of legal rules,
including their incentive and distributive effects. This portion of the Realists’ agenda has had a
profound inﬂuence on economic analysis of law, but it will not be the focus of discussion in this paper.
In contrast, the Realists’ positive theories of how judges make decisions have not generated a corre-
sponding contemporary economic analysis of judicial behavior.
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5 Building on earlier work by
inﬂuential thinkers like Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. (1897), Roscoe Pound (1908,
1909), and Wesley Hohfeld (1913), the Realists argued that the law rarely if ever
supplied determinate answers to legal questions, at least in hard cases, and that
there was a signiﬁcant gap between the real reasons that judges reached their
decisions and the legalistic explanations advanced in their written opinions.
Because Realists critiqued Formalism on these grounds, the Realists are some-
times characterized as Skeptics. Indeed, the modern empirical literature suggesting
that judges’ political attitudes are the principal determinant of case outcomes is
sometimes described as “new legal realism” (Cross, 1997; Miles and Sunstein,
2008b). Yet while the Realists rejected Formalism, for the most part they did not
embrace the radical Skeptical view that is sometimes attributed to them. The Realist
view is distinct from Skepticism in at least three important respects, each of which
has implications for the social scientiﬁc study of judicial decision making. The
remainder of this essay ﬂeshes out the Realist vision of judicial behavior by
elaborating these three points of divergence from Skepticism and suggesting how
this Realist perspective—implicit in some recent developments in the economic
study of judicial decision making—is helpful in moving beyond a crude “law vs.
ideology” debate toward a more nuanced understanding of the relationships
among law, facts, judicial preferences, and case outcomes.
“Real Law” May Differ From “Formal Law”
The ﬁrst crucial distinction between Realism and Skepticism is that, while the
Realists were united in the view that Formalist legal reasoning did not determine or
accurately predict judicial decisions, most Realists did not endorse the Skeptical
view that judicial decisions are idiosyncratic or crassly ideological. Rather, the
dominant strain of Realism maintained that although the formal law is a poor guide
to actual decisions, judges in practice apply a kind of “real law” that is more
sensitive to speciﬁc substantive areas or factual contexts. Indeed, a leading historian
of Realist thought has argued that the Realists’ “Core Claim” was that judges
respond in systematic and predictable ways to fact patterns that are not captured by
the narrow set of facts that are formally “legally relevant” (Leiter, 2003). Thus,
Realists believed that scholars could use inductive methods to extract from the set
of decided cases the actual legal rules that judges were using to decide cases.
Moreover, Realists emphasized that judges should (and often do) respect prece-
dent not by looking to the formal legalistic rationales advanced in earlier cases, but
rather by paying close attention to systematic patterns in how earlier judges
5 Some legal historians like Tamanaha (2008a) have legitimately questioned whether the “formalism” of
this earlier period in fact corresponded to Formalism as I have described it, but for present purposes,
what is important is that the Realists perceived the dominant paradigm of legal thought at the time to
be a version of Formalism not much more sophisticated than the caricature description presented here.
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1928). Furthermore, many Realists believed that practicing lawyers within given
ﬁelds have an intuitive (though perhaps incomplete) understanding of the “real”
law, as do parties like businesses and government ofﬁcials who deal regularly with
those ﬁelds of law.
Thus, while the Realists cautioned against trying to draw conclusions about the
nature and effects of law by taking written judicial opinions at face value, most
Realists thought that those who rejected the notion that one can learn anything
systematic about how the law operates in a given ﬁeld are also mistaken (for
example, Oliphant, 1928; Llewellyn, 1960; but see also Frank, 1930). The Realists
were somewhat successful in moving legal discourse away from broad, abstract,
deductive analysis and toward more a more context-sensitive, pragmatic, and
self-aware style of judicial reasoning. Because of this change in how judges and
scholars talk about law, the gap between the real reasons judges do what they do
and the reasons the judges give in their opinions is probably smaller now than it was
in the early twentieth century. Nonetheless, some gap likely persists.
The most obvious ramiﬁcation of this insight for economists is that, although
for some purposes it may sufﬁce to know only the formal rules, in many areas the
“formal law” that researchers can ﬁnd in canonical source materials may not
correspond to the “real law” as applied by judges and understood by other sophis-
ticated participants in the legal system. The point is not simply the familiar claim
that judges may be biased or ideological in some cases. Rather, Realism suggests
that there may be relatively consistent, stable patterns in judicial decisions, under-
stood (perhaps implicitly) by skilled lawyers, litigants, and judges, that are captured
neither by the formal rules nor by crude ideological measures. Jurisdictions with
identical formal law might have quite different real law, while jurisdictions with
divergent formal rules might turn out to have quite similar legal systems in practice.
Researchers interested in the effect of law on behavior might therefore be wary of
relying overmuch on the formal law. It may often be important to consult with
knowledgeable lawyers or other experts in the jurisdiction who can help identify
(and perhaps quantify) the “law in action” as distinct from the “law in books.”
Economists and other social scientists can also take up (and test) this Realist
claim by seeking to uncover the “real law.” Economists might, for example, inves-
tigate more closely how judges respond to case fact-patterns at a relatively high level
of contextual detail, and these studies might well provide valuable insights both
about judicial behavior and about the law that operates in particular ﬁelds. One
recent example of economic research in this spirit is Niblett, Posner, and Shleifer
(2008). This study considers judicial application of a private law doctrine called the
“economic loss rule” in the context of construction disputes. The economic loss
rule is a common law (that is, nonstatutory) rule according to which individuals
cannot sue in tort to recover for purely economic losses that are not due to personal
injury or property damage. In the construction industry, most suits for economic
losses are contract suits rather than tort suits, but the economic loss rule is still
important in construction disputes as there are many cases in which the economic
198 Journal of Economic Perspectivesloss arising from the builder’s alleged negligence is not covered by any express
contractual warranties or the warranties have expired. Niblett et al. compare the
formal statement of the economic loss rule and its recognized exceptions to how
courts actually apply the rule, and ﬁnd signiﬁcant deviations. In particular, Niblett
et al.’s data suggests that judicial willingness to invoke the economic loss rule
depends on a number of factors that are not formally relevant to the doctrine, such
as whether there is a substantial disparity in the economic power of the parties.
In a similar vein, Kastellec (2007) examines the inﬂuence of fact patterns on
judicial decisions using a statistical technique that produces “classiﬁcation trees” to
show how courts respond to recurring fact patterns in a large sample of cases.
Kastellec applies this method to federal court of appeals decisions in cases involving
a criminal defendant’s motion to suppress a confession. He ﬁnds that the courts
apply a relatively systematic legal rule in these cases, but also that this rule is not
fully captured by the formal statement of the doctrine. For instance, Kastellec ﬁnds
that between 1946 and 1966, when the formal doctrine on coerced confessions
called for an allegedly unpredictable “totality of the circumstances” test, a simple
three-part rule correctly predicts almost 90 percent of the case outcomes. That rule
asked, ﬁrst, whether the confession involved circumstances conducive to coercion
(for example, long periods of incommunicado conﬁnement, or use of physical
force); if coercion was involved, whether there were mitigating circumstances
(perhaps a waiver of rights or evidence that the confession was voluntary); and if
coercion was not involved, whether the confession was nonetheless the fruit of an
illegal procedure (like an illegal search). In contrast, in the 1967–1971 period—
immediately following the Supreme Court’s decision in Miranda v. Arizona (384
U.S. 436 [1966]) that defendants have the right to remain silent and the right to
have an attorney present during questioning—the courts followed a different
implicit rule that was inﬂuenced by, but not perfectly predicted by, Miranda. In this
period, courts asked ﬁrst whether mitigating circumstances were present, almost
always admitting confessions if the answer was yes; if not, the court would ask if the
Miranda warning had been given, excluding the confession if the answer was no;
ﬁnally, even when police issued the Miranda warning, the courts would look to
personal characteristics of the defendant that might contribute to, or detract from,
the voluntariness of the confession (such as mental deﬁciency or previous encoun-
ters with law enforcement). In the 1972–1981 period, even though there was no
substantial change in the formal doctrine, Kastellec’s analysis shows yet a different
legal rule with a more complex structure—one in which the presence or absence
of the Miranda warning does not even appear as a meaningful determinative factor.
Studies like those of Niblett et al. (2008) and Kastellec (2007), though limited
in their scope, are broadly consistent with Realist conjectures about the relation-
ship between the law in books and the law in action. Further work along these lines
may provide more evidence as to whether the Realists were correct in their
hypotheses regarding the existence of a real law that is more context-sensitive than
the formal law, yet still relatively stable and systematic.
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A Sketch of the Realist Conception of Legal “Constraint”
While the Realists, like the Skeptics, believed that law was logically indetermi-
nate—it is possible to construct a legal justiﬁcation for almost any result—most Realists
implicitly believed that legal sources and principles did have a causal (and constrain-
ing) effect on case outcomes (Tamanaha, 2008b). This belief rested on two closely
related observations. First, judges are rational human beings who have limited re-
sources. As the inﬂuential Realist Max Radin (1925, p. 362) put it: “Judges are people
and the economizing of mental effort is a characteristic of people, even if censorious
persons call it by a less ﬁne name....[ A ]judge economic of mental effort, may
decline to disturb [his initial impression of a case] by searching for new elements which
might compel the substitution of a wholly different situation.” As a result, judges will
often apply existing legal rules and principles to situations that appear familiar, without
much thought or reﬂection. In the words of Walter Wheeler Cook (1943), who is
generally considered a Realist despite his personal discomfort with the label, although
“in no ﬁeld of intellectual endeavor can previously worked-out generalizations—rules
and principles—be automatically applied to ‘new’ situations...[they] enable us to
dispose of routine cases which do not require thought.” This, Cook argued, was
“fortunate,” because “operations of thought are like cavalry charges in battle—they are
strictly limited in number” (Cook, 1943, pp. 419, quoting Whitehead, 1911).
Second, most Realists recognized that not all legal arguments are equally easy for
real-world judges to derive from conventional legal materials. Indeed, some legal
arguments might be so difﬁcult or costly to construct that for practical purposes the
judge experiences the law as binding (Cardozo, 1921, pp. 127–129; Kennedy, 1986). As
Karl Llewellyn (1950, p. 397, emphasis in original) explained, a judge will ﬁnd most of
the time that “lining up the authorities [to reach a conclusion that corresponds to the
judge’s sense of the situation] comes close to being an automatic job. In the very process
of reading an authority a distinction leaps to the eye, and that is ‘all’ that that case holds;
or the language of another authority...shines forth as ‘clearly stating the true rule.’”
But, Llewellyn continues, “Trouble comes when the cases do not line up this clearly and
semi-automatically, when they therefore call for intellectual labor, even at times for a
conclusion that the law as given will not allow the sensible result to be reached.”
Taken together, these two Realist propositions suggest a particular way in
which law may constrain what judges can or will do.
6 Let us posit a judicial utility
function in which the judge cares principally about two things: 1) the practical
6 This perspective on judging, which is implicit in the writings of many Realists, was ﬂeshed out more
explicitly by scholars associated with Critical Legal Studies, an intellectual descendant of Realism,
particularly Duncan Kennedy (1976, 1986), Joseph Singer (1984), and Mark Tushnet (1996). These
scholars were not only critiquing Formalism, but also responding to those who charged that Critical
Legal Studies embraced radical Skepticism and to other Critical Legal Studies scholars who did in fact
embrace that view. A version of this perspective on judging is also articulated in recent political economy
work (for example, Bueno de Mesquita and Stephenson, 2002; Lax and Cameron, 2007; Volokh, 2008;
Stephenson, 2006b).
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and 2) the costs associated with writing a legally persuasive opinion to justify that
outcome. The judge starts with knowledge of the parties to the dispute and the
basic contours of the facts, but the judge has only a rudimentary knowledge of the
relevant law and of the factual details. The judge forms an initial intuitive impres-
sion, or “hunch,” about how the case should come out (Radin, 1925; Hutcheson,
1929; Frank, 1930; Kennedy, 1986). The judge will then think about how easy it will
be to justify this hunch legally.
Sometimes, as Llewellyn (1950) suggests, it is easy for the judge to “lin[e] up
the authorities,” and to make any necessary distinctions or analogies to reach the
judge’s preferred outcome. For example, if the judge wishes to support the em-
ployee in our hypothetical employment-at-will case, perhaps there are many recog-
nized exceptions to the general principle that at-will termination clauses are valid,
and the judge can readily ﬁt the current case into one of those recognized
exceptions. If no recognized exception is available, the judge may do some more
work (or ask clerks to do more work) to see if there is a less obvious or more creative
way to use the legal source materials to reach the desired outcome. For example,
maybe there is no currently recognized exception in the context of at-will contracts,
but language in other cases suggests limits on contractual freedom that the judge
can extrapolate to this setting. Or perhaps even though the labor statute doesn’t
expressly protect workers from retaliatory termination in response to complaints to
a supervisor, it is possible to read several provisions of that statute together to imply
such a protection, or to ﬁnd other statutory schemes in which courts have read
anti-retaliation provisions to cover more than their plain text alone would suggest.
The hypothetical judge in this setting might be consciously trying to ﬁnd a way to
avoid what seem to be the dictates of the law, but this need not be the case. Indeed,
the judge may experience this process as “discovering” more compelling legal
arguments.
In other cases, though, the judge will ﬁnd that the costs of writing a legally
persuasive opinion in favor of the most-preferred outcome are very high, perhaps
requiring an extraordinary degree of legal creativity and complexity. In such cases,
the judge may ﬁnd that the opinion originally preferred “just won’t write” (Wald,
1995). The judge might subjectively experience these cases as ones in which the law
“dictates” a decision. Of course, even if a judge ﬁnds it too costly to write a
persuasive opinion justifying the most preferred outcome, the judge may still be
willing to bear the costs of writing an opinion that gets somewhat closer to the
desired outcome. Put another way, judges do not automatically select the opinion
that is easiest to justify legally, nor the opinion that delivers the most desired
outcome, but rather the judge balances these interests, making whatever trade-off
is optimal in a given case (see also Volokh, 2008).
In this framework, Formalism simply describes a special case of the more
general Realist model in which the costs of writing a legally persuasive opinion are
inﬁnite for all opinions except the one which is legally correct—and for that
opinion these costs are close to zero. Likewise, Skepticism can also be described as
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persuasive opinion are identical for all possible outcomes. The Realist account of
judicial behavior is useful because it suggests that, compared to these special cases,
more variability and complexity is both possible and likely.
This conceptualization of the judicial utility function and the nature of the
legal constraint, however, begs some central questions: Why do judges care whether
the justiﬁcations that they give are legally plausible? What determines which legal
arguments are deemed “plausible” (and by whom), and why are some such argu-
ments “easier” or “harder” to make? To the extent that the Realists themselves
engaged these questions, they seemed to think that the answers had something to
do with the shared expectations and normative commitments of the relevant
community regarding what should count as a “good” or “correct” or “legitimate”
legal reason for a particular conclusion. More recent commentators have similarly
suggested that legal argumentation is like a game that judges enjoy playing, and
whose enjoyment would be diminished if they didn’t play by the rules (Posner,
1993; but see Schuaer, 2000), or that judges are like artists or craftsmen who value
aesthetic excellence in their ﬁeld (Posner, 2008). These analogies may capture
something about how judges experience their work, but they still beg the question:
Why do judges feel like they’re playing a game with rules? Why these particular rules?
Perhaps the explanation may lie in judges’ concern with various external
observers and constituencies. Lower court judges might care about avoiding rever-
sal by appellate courts (Higgins and Rubin, 1980) or increasing their chances for
promotion to higher courts (Cohen, 1991). Judges may also care about avoiding
reversal or retaliation by the political branches (Gely and Spiller, 1992a,b). Yet
these explanations are also incomplete. Even if the main reason that lower court
judges care about advancing persuasive legal justiﬁcations for their rulings is to
avoid reversal on appeal, this just kicks the question up a level: Why then should the
appellate judges or Supreme Court justices care about persuasive legal reasoning?
Likewise, while judges might care about the reaction of other political actors, such
as the legislature or the executive, it is not clear why those actors should care about
the quality of legal argumentation in the opinion, as opposed to the outcome of the
case—and in most cases they probably don’t. Perhaps judges care about legal
persuasiveness because they enjoy being showered with praise for legal brilliance by
colleagues and elite law professors, and dislike being pilloried for legal sloppiness,
in something of the spirit discussed by Posner (1993) and Singer (1984). But again,
we are answering the question of why judges care about legal craft by positing that
some other set of actors, to whom judges are responsive, cares about legal craft. But
why do these other actors care? And why do judges care what they think?
No one, to my knowledge, has developed a fully convincing social scientiﬁc
account of the incentives that shape the judicial desire for legal persuasiveness and
the differential costliness of various legal arguments. Yet contemporary participants
in the legal system regularly report that something like this actually does exist.
Figuring out why judges experience law as constraining (assuming that they do)
might suggest additional insights into how variation across judges may affect case
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judge experiences law as a constraint? Perhaps a more talented judge will face lower
costs in ﬁnding a plausible legal argument to justify a preferred conclusion, which
suggests talent is inversely correlated with constraint. However, a more talented
judge may also face relatively higher costs for engaging in more creative legal
arguments because of the greater attention to detail that such arguments will
demand from a meticulous judge. As another possibility, judges’ backgrounds and
personal characteristics as well as their method of selection and retention may also
affect how much they care about legal craft, and what sorts of legal arguments they
or their constituencies experience as “persuasive.”
Some Implications of the Realist Account of Legal Constraint
The Realist conceptualization of the judge’s utility function suggests a useful
and ﬂexible way of conceptualizing the fact that both legal and nonlegal factors
may have a causal effect on judicial behavior. The most straightforward implication
of the Realist approach concerns how the judge’s interest in the case outcome
affects the degree to which legal sources inﬂuence the decision.
Consider judicial interpretation of contracts. While judges usually enforce
contracts according to their apparent terms, few contracts are complete. Moreover,
contract law doctrine recognizes exceptions to general rules, qualiﬁcations to the
exceptions, and so forth. For example, according to a doctrine called the “parol
evidence rule,” judges are supposed to consider only the written contract, not any
prior oral agreements. That sounds like a clear restraint on judges’ ability to depart
from the terms of the written contract—but there is a recognized exception to the
parol evidence rule for cases where the content or scope of the written contract is
ambiguous. The ambiguity determination leaves judges considerable discretion
(Chirelstein, 2001). Given that judges have some discretion to avoid the apparent
terms of a written contract, it is reasonable to hypothesize that a judge may be more
likely to try to ﬁnd a legal justiﬁcation for avoiding enforcement of these terms
when enforcement leads to outcomes that the judge views as particularly distasteful
(Niblett, Posner, and Shleifer, 2008; Gennaioli, 2006). Skilled judges can often
construct plausible legal arguments to get to a nonobvious result if they are
sufﬁciently motivated to do so.
Similarly, it may usually be relatively easy for judges to resolve questions of
statutory construction by looking to the statute’s “plain meaning” without extensive
inquiries into legislative history or purpose and without engaging in nonobvious
semantic arguments. When a case arouses a judge’s moral or policy commitments,
though, that judge is more likely to look beyond text to other legal sources, and
more likely to reach a conclusion that differs from what might seem to be the most
“plain” reading of the text. There is some evidence that Supreme Court justices
behave this way. Schauer (1991) examined all the statutory interpretation cases
from a single Supreme Court term and found that almost all the justices relied on
“plain meaning” in low-stakes, nonideological cases but were much more likely to
engage in more creative forms of interpretation in high-stakes cases. This is
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constrain judges by making certain decisions more costly, but the constraint is
weaker when a judge cares more about the outcome (Volokh, 2008).
One can make a similar point with respect to the role of precedent. Many
lawyers and legal scholars assert both that precedent matters a great deal to judges
and that it is usually possible to construct arguments consistent with prior prece-
dent for a variety of possible results. These beliefs appear to be in some tension, but
on the Realist view, they can be reconciled. While it is possible to construct argu-
ments from precedent (or, at least, consistent with precedent) for almost any
outcome, some arguments are straightforward while others require more judicial
creativity. A judge’s willingness to incur the costs associated with more creative legal
maneuvers will depend on the strength of the incentives to do so (Bueno de
Mesquita and Stephenson, 2002; Gennaioli and Shleifer, 2007a,b). The magnitude
of these costs may depend in part on the density and speciﬁcity of the precedents
that have developed within the relevant ﬁeld of law (Kennedy, 1986; Bueno de
Mesquita and Stephenson, 2002). It is not necessarily the case, however, that a
greater stock of precedents will impose more constraints on the judge. Sometimes
a large body of precedent gives the judge more freedom, because there is more
material to work with—more analogies to choose from, more exceptions to enter-
tain, and so forth.
The Realist perspective on adjudication also has implications for the degree to
which judges defer to legal decisions reached by other institutions, such as legis-
latures and executive ofﬁcials. Courts often have an incentive to defer, and to
develop general doctrines of deference, because it is usually less costly to write an
opinion upholding the act of another entity than to explain why that entity was
legally mistaken. But such deference is less likely when the judge views the decision
under review as leading to a bad outcome (Stephenson, 2006a,b). The empirical
evidence on judicial deference, though limited in many ways, seems generally
consistent with this view. Miles and Sunstein (2006, 2008a) ﬁnd that while judges
routinely defer to administrative agency decisions with which they disagree, judges
are much less likely to defer in case of a substantive policy disagreement than when
they share the agency’s political views. Furthermore, if the Realist position is
correct, the political salience of a case should be inversely correlated with the
probability that a judge defers to an agency decision that he or she dislikes on
ideological grounds. Recent high-proﬁle Supreme Court cases—such as the deci-
sion in Massachusetts v. EPA (549 U.S. 497 [2007]) to invalidate the EPA’s claim that
it had no authority to regulate greenhouse gases and the decision in FDA v. Brown
& Williamson Tobacco (529 U.S. 120 [2000]) to strike down the FDA’s decision to
regulate tobacco products—provide anecdotal support for this hypothesis, as these
cases, which involved high-proﬁle and contentious (and partisan) political disputes,
both produced a 5–4 split along predictable ideological lines with the majority
refusing to defer to the agency’s interpretation of the governing statute.
Another implication of the Realist account of judging is that as the demands
on judicial time and resources increase, judges are less likely to devote substantial
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costs of doing so are higher. If this is true, greater judicial workloads may be
associated with “cheaper” legal methods of resolving cases—dismissals on proce-
dural grounds, upholding lower court decisions rather than overturning them, and
so forth. Huang’s (2007) examination of how the federal courts of appeals have
responded to caseload shocks ﬁnds evidence consistent with this view. This ﬁnding
further suggests that placing greater demands on judicial time and resources might
also induce more difﬁcult-to-measure, but perhaps more interesting and important,
changes in judicial behavior. Perhaps, following Schauer’s (1991) suggestive evi-
dence on Supreme Court statutory interpretation decisions, greater workloads
might induce more reliance on “plain meaning” in statutory cases or, more gen-
erally, might increase the observed strength of the legal “constraint,” as judges
strive for quick and easy ways to dispose of a larger number of cases. There is not
to my knowledge any direct evidence for these hypotheses, but they seem worth
exploring.
The Realist view of judging may also shed additional light on the role of legal
advocacy in the judicial decision-making process. Some social science research
analogizes lawyers to lobbyists supplying information about the policy conse-
quences of a particular decision (Johnson, 2001; Dewatripont and Tirole, 1999).
This analogy may help capture the Realist insight that judges care very much about
factual context and policy considerations, yet the analogy also seems to miss
important aspects of modern legal advocacy: the arguments from precedent, the
careful parsing of statutory or regulatory language, and the analogies to other areas
of law. Although the Realists did not, for the most part, develop a positive account
of legal advocacy, many of them developed arguments about effective legal advo-
cacy that are largely consistent with the belief that judges feel the need to justify
their decisions according to accepted modes of legitimate legal reasoning and that
the difﬁculties of doing so may sometimes shape their outcome. In addition to
supplying judges with information about facts, legal advocates make speciﬁcally
legal arguments as a way of lowering the cost to the judge of reaching the advocate’s
preferred outcome by, in essence, doing some of the judge’s work.
7
Karl Llewellyn (1960), drawing on earlier observations by Fuller (1934), cap-
tured this idea by pointing out that a lawyer is unlikely to succeed, even when the
judge is sympathetic to the lawyer’s proposed case outcome, if the lawyer “fail[s] to
furnish...a‘doctrinal bridge’ over Jordan; doubly not if counsel actually set[s] up
barriers by a doctrinal argument so inept as to make a gap and innovation seem
bigger...than they are.” An effective legal advocate may also be able to raise the
cost of an opposing view by pointing out problems and complications that would
force a conscientious judge to do more legal work to justify that outcome. This
perspective is consistent with Johnson, Wahlbeck, and Spriggs’s (2006) ﬁnding that
the quality of a lawyer’s argument (measured principally by the “grades” that
7 For an analogous argument with respect to legislative lobbying, see Hall and Deardorff (2006).
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8) had a greater effect on a justice’s vote when
the lawyer was arguing for a position that was not too far from the justice’s
preferred outcome. As a Realist perspective would predict, good legal advocacy can
furnish the “bridge over Jordan” for a sympathetic justice—indeed, it can make the
difference between getting and losing that justice’s vote—but it is unlikely to sway
a justice who strongly opposes the attorney’s favored outcome. In a similar vein,
McAtee and McGuire (2007) ﬁnd that the quality of a Supreme Court advocate
(measured using a combination of the Blackmun grades and the lawyer’s prior
Supreme Court litigating experience) appears to have a greater impact on case
outcomes in cases with lower public salience (as measured by media coverage). This
ﬁnding is also consistent with the Realist hypothesis that legal argumentation can
have an important inﬂuence on judicial votes, but is less likely to do so when the
stakes are high. While studies in this vein are far from conclusive—especially since
the proxies for the quality of legal argument are problematic—they are more
consistent with a Realist perspective on judging than with the Formalist or Skeptical
accounts.
Judges Care about Shaping Future Decisions through Legal
Doctrine
A third sense in which the Realist account of judging differs from the Skeptical
account is the Realist emphasis on the fact that judges are not only law-appliers, but
also law-creators. Judges, that is, are producers as well as consumers of judicial
precedent. An appellate judge deciding a case is likely to consider not only the
outcome of the individual case and the costs of writing a plausible legal justiﬁcation
for that outcome, but also how the opinion will affect the development of legal
doctrine and hence the costs that future judges will face in legally justifying partic-
ular results in future cases. Because the Realists were acutely aware that the legal
doctrines developed and elaborated by judges would inﬂuence subsequent deci-
sions, they emphasized the role that considerations of justice and policy ought to
play in the development of doctrine. In the Realist view, a judge may sometimes be
willing to reach a less-preferred result in a particular case, or to incur additional
costs of squaring a decision with legal authority, in order to establish or entrench
a doctrine or principle that the judge favors or to modify one that the judge
dislikes.
The most famous example of this sort of behavior from U.S. legal history is
probably the Supreme Court’s decision in Marbury v. Madison (5 U.S. 137 [1803]),
in which Chief Justice John Marshall reached a decision that favored his political
8 Interestingly, Johnson, Wahlbeck, and Spriggs (2006) also ﬁnd that Justice Blackmun’s grades are
somewhat correlated with other proxies for attorney quality and do not seem driven simply by the degree
to which Justice Blackmun agreed with the position the attorney was advocating.
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judicial review—which Marshall viewed as more important than the outcome of the
case at hand.
9 Such behavior, though perhaps not common, appears to take place
in other, less dramatic contexts as well. For example, a judge may occasionally defer
to the decision of a regulatory agency that the judge dislikes in order to strengthen
the presumption of deference to agency interpretations, or a judge might deny
standing (the right to bring a lawsuit) to a plaintiff with whom the judge sympa-
thizes, in order to maintain strict adherence to a standing doctrine that the judge
believes will be desirable in the majority of cases (Ho and Ross, forthcoming).
Actions in support of desired legal doctrines, rather than desired case outcomes,
are likely to be more pronounced for judges on higher courts, who can reasonably
expect to have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on doctrinal development, than for lower
court judges, who are likely to see their marginal contribution to doctrinal devel-
opment as trivial.
Some recent formal models of judicial decision making have taken up this
Realist insight, considering both the interest of appellate judges in inﬂuencing
future appellate policy outcomes (Rasmussen, 1994; Posner, 2008) and their inter-
est in inﬂuencing the application of law by lower courts (Bueno de Mesquita and
Stephenson, 2002; Lax, 2008). These models emphasize that an appellate judge
may face a trade-off between achieving that judge’s most-preferred outcome in the
current case and securing more favorable outcomes in future cases decided by
other courts. This may increase the appellate judge’s willingness to adhere to past
precedent, both to maintain an equilibrium in which that judge’s own rulings are
respected (Rasmussen, 1994) and to communicate more effectively with lower
courts (Bueno de Mesquita and Stephenson, 2002). The interest in controlling
future decisions may also lead the appellate judge to endorse clear rules rather than
discretionary standards, at least when monitoring lower court compliance is rela-
tively more important (Lax, 2008). These lines of inquiry suggest a promising
avenue for future research.
9 The speciﬁc dispute in Marbury v. Madison involved President John Adams’ “midnight appointment” of
federal judges and magistrates after Thomas Jefferson won the 1800 presidential election. Not all these
new appointees received their commissions before Jefferson took ofﬁce. One of these appointees
(Marbury) sought a judicial order that the new Secretary of State (Madison) deliver his commission. The
new Chief Justice Marshall’s political sympathies likely lay with Marbury, but his opinion for the
Supreme Court in Marbury v. Madison rejected Marbury’s claim on the grounds that the statute on which
he based that claim, the Judiciary Act of 1801, was unconstitutional. This was signiﬁcant because
Marshall favored a strong federal Supreme Court with the power of judicial review, which the Jefferso-
nians generally opposed. Justice Marshall gave the Jeffersonians a victory in the particular case—
Marbury never got his commission—but did so in a way that secured a much more signiﬁcant doctrinal
victory for proponents of a strong Supreme Court.
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Economists have made great progress in understanding the incentives and
behavior of actors who operate outside of traditional economic markets, including
voters, legislators, and bureaucrats. The incentives and behavior of judges, how-
ever, remain largely opaque. The jurisprudential theories of the American Legal
Realists suggest a nuanced account of judicial decision making that goes beyond
the Formalist and Skeptical perspectives on judging. This Realist theory of adjudi-
cation is based on a belief that judges care about outcomes, but that legal doctrine
also exerts an inﬂuence on legal decisions because judges feel the need to justify
their conclusions in acceptable legal terms. Judges must therefore consider the
relative costs and beneﬁts of investing effort in following something other than the
path of least (legal) resistance.
Taking the Realist perspective seriously opens up a variety of research possi-
bilities. First, it would be useful to follow the lead of those researchers who have
explored more sophisticated ways of classifying judicial decisions, in order to test
empirically the Realists’ core claim that there are underlying patterns of judicial
decision making captured neither by formal doctrine nor by crude measures of
ideology. Second, given that so much of the Realist account depends on the idea
that judges experience different costs of writing legal opinions for different out-
comes, researchers might seek to identify the sources of these costs. Third, the
Realist perspective suggests a number of comparative hypotheses regarding the
conditions under which law and legal argument are most (or least) likely to matter,
as well as how judicial behavior might change in response to changes in resource
constraints, talent, or the external environment. The stale Formalism vs. Skepticism
dichotomy obscures these and other questions, while the Realist perspective brings
them to the fore.
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Kaplow, Lewis Kornhauser, Duncan Kennedy, Nicola Persico, Todd Rakoff, Ben Sachs, Fred
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Volokh for helpful comments and conversations.
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